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Culture Matters:
The Ties that Bind U.S.-Japan Relations
by Matthew KustenbauDer
When President Obama embarked on his Asia tour in November, it was 
hardly surprising that Japan was the first stop. With an economy second 
only to the United States’, Japan’s place in the world, Obama noted, has been 
firmly at America’s side since the day President Dwight D. Eisenhower stood 
beside Japan’s Prime Minister and declared the creation of “an indestructible 
partnership” based on “equality and mutual understanding.”1  
To be sure, the ties that bind the two nations run deep. The United States 
underwrote Japan’s recovery after World War II, first canceling war repara-
tions payments and then purchasing over a quarter of Japan’s exports in 
support of America’s military engagement in the Korean peninsula. Even so, 
Japan received nothing like Europe’s Marshall Plan. The real reason for the 
Japanese Miracle was, according to Obama, the “Japanese peoples’ spirit of 
resilience and industriousness,” by which they emerged from wartime dev-
astation and quickly climbed to the top of the world economic heap. These 
“common values,” noted the President, explain the success of Japan and of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
They are provocative words that warrant a reevaluation of culture’s sig-
nificance in economic development and foreign affairs. Could it be that the 
U.S.-Japanese powerhouse, which accounts for a third of global economic 
output and nearly forty-five percent of world military spending, rests on a 
bedrock of shared cultural values? A closer look at the history of Japanese 
foreign relations suggests that culture did, in fact, play a critical role in Ja-
pan’s success on the international stage.
In his book, Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan, Daniel Bots-Winter 2010 162
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man argues that Japan’s modernization resulted from its desire to gain the 
respect of America and the “great powers.” It is a story of breaking with a 
barbaric past, emerging onto the world scene as an underdog, and cumulat-
ing international political clout by “talking the same talk” as the West. The 
reform of Japan’s penal system exemplifies this transformation. 
The brutal capital and corporal punishments of its pre-modern era highlight 
the extent of modern Japan’s departure from its sanguinary past. Japanese 
society during the Tokugawa period (1603-1868) was governed by a warrior 
class of samurai under the direction of powerful shogun generals. These 
military leaders were the de facto rulers of a centralized feudal system that 
brought peace and stability to Japanese society for two hundred and fifty 
years. But peace came with a price.
The spectacle of punishments horrified Western nations, whose global expan-
sion frequently brought them to Japan’s shores. When Commodore Matthew 
Perry and the U.S. Navy arrived in Edo (Tokyo) Bay in 1853, the isolationist 
shoguns were forced to accept a series of treaties that opened Japan’s ports 
to foreign traders, diplomats, and sailors. The “Unequal Treaties” converged 
with a rising tide of social ferment within Japan to undermine the Tokugawa 
shogunate, which eventually succumbed to revolution.
In 1868, the newly established Meiji government focused on “building na-
tional strength in the face of the foreign threat.”2  The foremost objective was 
to scrap the Unequal Treaties and place Japan on more equal footing with the 
great powers. As histories of nationalism demonstrate, a sense of inferiority 
can be a powerful motivator.
Japanese prison reform, one aspect of Japan’s nationalist transformation in 
the years after the Meiji Restoration, offers a compelling case of the impact 
of culture on international relations. Meiji leaders understood that cultural 
adjustment had the potential to stave off colonial encroachment. Western 
nations justified the Unequal Treaties on ideological grounds – their citizens 
couldn’t be locked away in Japanese prisons or tried in Japanese courts until 
the specter of “Oriental barbarism” was laid to rest. 
Within months of the coup, the Meiji denounced the “evil practices of the 
past” and pledged to seek “new knowledge” from the West.3  In 1871 a new 
national criminal code, the Shinritsu koryo, made sweeping changes. It 
abolished the practice of burning criminals alive, curbed the ever-popular 
crucifixion, replaced banishment with “penal servitude,” and subjected capi-
tal sentences to the emperor’s approval. Meiji envoys distributed copies of Yale Journal of International Affairs 
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the new code in the United States and Europe during a diplomatic mission 
to reopen treaty negotiations.
To further convince Western nations, Japan’s leaders overhauled its prisons 
and courts as well. In 1874, just six years after the Meiji Restoration, Japan’s 
first modern, Western-style prison was completed in Tokyo.
While reforms in the prisons alone cannot explain Japan’s dramatic rise, they 
were emblematic of a wider transformation of Japanese society. The feudal 
structures that bound Japanese people together for centuries were replaced 
virtually overnight by a network of prisons, factories, military regiments, and 
schools that regulated the day-to-day activities of the nation’s citizens. These 
new institutions worked in lockstep to discipline the masses and achieve the 
dream of a modern, civilized Japan. 
Significantly, the Unequal Treaties ended with Japan’s success in its first 
modern war with China (1894-1895) and the annexation of Taiwan as a 
colony. Their 1905 victory over tsarist Russia surprised the world and gave 
a boost to Japanese nationalism by proving that it could defeat a Western 
empire. Japan had finally joined the ranks of imperial nations and achieved 
“great power” status.
Thus Japan’s pivotal moment came at the end of the nineteenth century, when 
the threat of Western colonialism triggered a social and cultural revolution. 
Had the Meiji government failed, history would look very different. A great 
Japanese empire may never have dominated the Pacific. More importantly, 
the “common values” of “resilience and industriousness” may never have 
taken shape.
Obama was right about one thing. The U.S.-Japan alliance is more than an 
economic partnership; it’s about shared values and interests. With the threat 
of a nuclear-armed North Korea and the rise of China as a major player, Ja-
pan occupies a strategic position in American foreign policy. The question is 
whether the United States can build on a shared history and common cultural 
values to retain Japan as an ally. In a world in which the relative power of 
the two nations is eroding, the need to strengthen the ties that bind America 
and Japan are more pressing now than ever.  Y
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